{"licence":{"name":"CC BY-SA 4.0","spdx":"CC-BY-SA-4.0","url":"https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/","attribution":"Atlas, a bilingual technical dictionary (https://cmaintz.github.io/tech-atlas/)"},"id":"security/zero-trust","url":{"en":"https://cmaintz.github.io/tech-atlas/en/terms/security/zero-trust/","da":"https://cmaintz.github.io/tech-atlas/da/terms/security/zero-trust/"},"term":{"en":"Zero Trust","da":"Zero Trust"},"aka":{"en":["zero trust architecture","ZTA"],"da":["Zero Trust-arkitektur","ZTA"]},"domain":["security"],"cluster":"controls","layer":"identity","status":"current","era":2010,"summary":{"en":"A security principle of never trusting anyone automatically - every request is checked, even from inside the network.","da":"Et sikkerhedsprincip om aldrig automatisk at stole på nogen - hver anmodning tjekkes, også fra netværket indefra."},"body":{"formal":{"en":"A design approach in which no user, device or network location is trusted by default; each request for access is checked for identity, device health and need, and given only the least access required for that one task.","da":"En designtilgang, hvor ingen bruger, enhed eller netværksplacering er betroet på forhånd; hver anmodning om adgang tjekkes for identitet, enhedens tilstand og behov og får kun den mindste adgang, der kræves til netop den opgave."},"plain":{"en":"Like a hospital where your badge is checked at every ward door, not just at the main entrance - getting inside the building does not get you everywhere.","da":"Som et hospital, hvor dit adgangskort tjekkes ved hver afdelingsdør, ikke kun ved hovedindgangen - at være kommet ind i bygningen giver ikke adgang overalt."},"inPractice":{"en":"An employee at her desk inside a ministry opens the payroll system and is still asked to prove who she is, while her laptop is checked for current updates before the page loads.","da":"En medarbejder ved sit skrivebord i et ministerium åbner lønsystemet og skal stadig bevise, hvem hun er, mens hendes bærbare tjekkes for opdateringer, før siden indlæses."},"whyItMatters":{"en":"Once one machine inside is taken over, a network that trusts its insiders lets the attacker roam freely; checking every request limits how far one break-in spreads.","da":"Når én maskine indenfor er overtaget, lader et netværk, der stoler på sine egne, angriberen bevæge sig frit; at tjekke hver anmodning begrænser, hvor langt ét indbrud spreder sig."}},"deepDive":{"en":"The ideas predate the name. The Jericho Forum argued from 2004 for \"de-perimeterisation\", and in 2010 Forrester analyst John Kindervag coined \"zero trust\" for a model that removes implicit trust based on network location. Google's BeyondCorp, described in a series of papers from 2014, was the first large-scale implementation: employees reached internal applications through an internet-facing access proxy that evaluated user identity and device inventory state, with no privileged corporate network. NIST SP 800-207 (2020) became the reference definition, with seven tenets that include treating all data sources and services as resources, securing all communication regardless of location, granting access per session, deciding access by dynamic policy, and continuously monitoring asset integrity and posture.\n\nArchitecturally, SP 800-207 separates a control plane from a data plane. The policy decision point comprises the policy engine, which evaluates a trust algorithm, and the policy administrator, which establishes or tears down the session; the policy enforcement point sits in the data path in front of the resource. Inputs to the trust algorithm include the identity provider, device management and EDR posture, threat intelligence, activity logs, data classification and access policy. NIST distinguishes criteria-based algorithms (all conditions must be met) from score-based ones (a confidence level compared with a threshold), and singular from contextual evaluation that considers recent behaviour. It describes three implementation approaches - enhanced identity governance, micro-segmentation and software-defined perimeters - and deployment models such as device agent with gateway, resource portal and enclave gateway. NIST SP 1800-35, finalised in 2025, documents example builds with commercial products.\n\nFor planning, CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0 (2023) defines five pillars - identity, devices, networks, applications and workloads, data - with cross-cutting capabilities for visibility and analytics, automation and orchestration, and governance, and four maturity stages from Traditional through Initial and Advanced to Optimal. US federal agencies were directed by OMB M-22-09 (2022) toward phishing-resistant MFA, device inventories, encrypted DNS and HTTP, and treating internal applications as internet-accessible.\n\nIn practice the common first steps are zero trust network access (ZTNA) replacing broad VPN access with per-application brokering, conditional access that combines identity and device compliance, and segmentation that restricts east-west traffic. Pitfalls are well known: the identity provider becomes a concentration of risk and must itself be hardened and monitored; legacy protocols such as NTLM, SMB file shares and OT systems resist per-request enforcement; session tokens issued after a strong check can be stolen and replayed; and vendors label almost any access product \"zero trust\". The model does not eliminate trust - it makes each trust decision explicit, narrow, short-lived and logged.","da":"Idéerne er ældre end navnet. Jericho Forum argumenterede fra 2004 for \"de-perimeterisering\", og i 2010 skabte Forrester-analytikeren John Kindervag betegnelsen \"zero trust\" for en model, der fjerner implicit tillid baseret på netværksplacering. Googles BeyondCorp, beskrevet i en række artikler fra 2014, var den første implementering i stor skala: medarbejdere tilgik interne applikationer gennem en internetvendt access proxy, der vurderede brugerens identitet og enhedens status i inventaret, uden et privilegeret virksomhedsnetværk. NIST SP 800-207 (2020) blev referencedefinitionen med syv grundsætninger, bl.a. at alle datakilder og tjenester behandles som ressourcer, at al kommunikation sikres uanset placering, at adgang gives pr. session, at adgang afgøres af dynamisk politik, og at aktivernes integritet og sikkerhedstilstand overvåges løbende.\n\nArkitektonisk adskiller SP 800-207 et kontrolplan fra et dataplan. Policy decision point består af policy engine, der evaluerer en tillidsalgoritme, og policy administrator, der etablerer eller nedlægger sessionen; policy enforcement point sidder i datastien foran ressourcen. Input til tillidsalgoritmen omfatter identitetsudbyderen, enhedsstyring og EDR-status, threat intelligence, aktivitetslogs, dataklassifikation og adgangspolitik. NIST skelner mellem kriteriebaserede algoritmer (alle betingelser skal være opfyldt) og scorebaserede (et tillidsniveau sammenlignes med en tærskel) og mellem enkeltstående og kontekstuel evaluering, der tager højde for nylig adfærd. Den beskriver tre implementeringstilgange - udvidet identitetsstyring, mikrosegmentering og software-defined perimeters - og udrulningsmodeller som device agent med gateway, ressourceportal og enclave gateway. NIST SP 1800-35, færdiggjort i 2025, dokumenterer eksempelopbygninger med kommercielle produkter.\n\nTil planlægning definerer CISA's Zero Trust Maturity Model 2.0 (2023) fem søjler - identitet, enheder, netværk, applikationer og workloads samt data - med tværgående kapabiliteter for synlighed og analyse, automatisering og orkestrering samt governance og fire modenhedstrin fra Traditional over Initial og Advanced til Optimal. Amerikanske føderale myndigheder blev med OMB M-22-09 (2022) pålagt at bevæge sig mod phishing-resistent MFA, enhedsfortegnelser, krypteret DNS og HTTP og at behandle interne applikationer, som om de var tilgængelige fra internettet.\n\nI praksis er de almindelige første skridt zero trust network access (ZTNA), der erstatter bred VPN-adgang med formidling pr. applikation, betinget adgang, der kombinerer identitet og enhedens compliance, og segmentering, der begrænser øst-vest-trafik. Faldgruberne er velkendte: identitetsudbyderen bliver en koncentration af risiko og skal selv hærdes og overvåges; ældre protokoller som NTLM, SMB-fildeling og OT-systemer modstår håndhævelse pr. forespørgsel; sessionstokens udstedt efter et stærkt tjek kan stjæles og genbruges; og leverandører kalder næsten ethvert adgangsprodukt \"zero trust\". Modellen afskaffer ikke tillid - den gør hver tillidsbeslutning eksplicit, snæver, kortvarig og logget."},"edges":[{"type":"requires","to":"cs/authentication","confidence":"high","strength":"normal"},{"type":"requires","to":"cs/authorization","confidence":"high","strength":"normal"},{"type":"requires","to":"cs/least-privilege","confidence":"high","strength":"normal"},{"type":"requires","to":"cs/network-segmentation","confidence":"high","strength":"normal"},{"type":"mitigates","to":"security/lateral-movement","confidence":"high","strength":"normal"}],"depth":5,"sources":[{"title":"Cyber Security Fast Track - Ordliste","tier":"course-material"},{"title":"NIST SP 800-207 - Zero Trust Architecture","tier":"standard","publisher":"NIST"},{"title":"NIST SP 1800-35 - Implementing a Zero Trust Architecture","url":"https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/1800/35/final","tier":"standard","publisher":"NIST"}],"draft":true}